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NOTES AND COMMENT
the beneficiary is any other relation to the testator, or is a
stranger to him. The reason for this is obvious; it is only the
parent-child issue relation that falls under both the pretermission
and anti-lapse statutes.
NORMAN ROBB
ADOPTION: THE NEED IN MONTANA FOR A
STATUTE EXPRESSLY DEFINING THE
INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF
ADOPTED CHILDREN
Although the adoption of children was a thing unknown to
the common law, it was a familiar practice under the Roman or
civil law, and for this reason our modern statutes of adoption
are taken from the latter. These statutes, then, modify the com-
mon law rules as to the succession of property whenever a ques-
tion of adoption arises.1 Since the statutes conferring adoption
are not always clearly defined as to the inheritance rights of the
adopted child, the result is that similar statutes are often inter-
preted differently." In looking to decisions in states having
similar statutes to Montana's concerning the inheritance rights
of adopted children, the problems which arise under such statutes
will be examined under the headings of inheritance to, through,
and from the adopted child.
I. Inheritance to the Adopted Child
It is generally held that an adopted child will succeed by in-
heritance to the estate of the adopting parent in the same manner
as a natural child.! In one Montana case which was a proceeding
by a collateral relative of the testator to contest his will wherein
the testator gave his estate to his adopted daughter, the court
said that even if there were not a will, Elizabeth Meyer, being
the adopted daughter of Simon Pepin, would succeed to all of
his estate under the Statute as against the petitioner or any other
collateral heirs.' The Statutes which the Court referred to are
now R. C. M. 1947, Section 61-134, on the effect of adoption, and
R. C. M. 1947, Section 91-403, on the succession to and distribu-
tion of estates. Neither of these Statutes define the inheritance
'Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900).
'ATiKINSON, WILLS, § 31, p. 6 (1937).
'In re Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213, 16 P. 887 (1888) ; 2 C. J. S. Adoption§ 63; 1 Am. Jur. Adoption of Children § 59; 1 R. C. L. Adoption of Chil-
dren § 29.
'In re Pepin's Estate, 53 Mont. 240; 163 P. 104 (1917).
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rights of adopted children, but the courts must still interpret
them as to these rights. R. C. M. 1947, Section 61-134 provides:
"A child when adopted may take the family name
of the person adopting. After adoption the two shall
sustain towards each other the legal relation of parent
and child and have all the rights and be subject to all the
duties of that relation."
R. C. M. 1947, Section 91-403 provides for the manner in which
estates are distributed when not disposed of by will. It does not
expressly mention the rights of adopted children by any pro-
vision. Atkinson, in his textbook on Wills has stated,
"The rights of inheritance, where adoption is con-
cerned, are sometimes clearly defined by the statutes.
Often, however, the result is not evident from the statu-
tory wording. In this situation the courts' decisions are
influenced by their views as to how far the adopted child
should be regarded in the same light as if he were the
natural child of the adoptive parent."'
As the Montana case cited above is the only decision by our
Supreme Court interpreting these Statutes, one cannot with cer-
tainty predict the result this Court would reach on other problems
as to the adoptee's inheritance rights.
One of the problems that may come before our courts in the
future is whether if an adoptee can inherit from his adoptive
parents, he can also inherit from his natural parents.
"An adopted child is, in a legal sense, the child both
of its natural and of its adoptive parents, and is not,
because of the adoption deprived of its right of inherit-
ance from its natural parents, unless the statute express-
ly so provides."
In a California case' decided under statutes8 similar to Montana's,
that Court held that the adopted child and its adoptive parents
inherit from each other to the exclusion of the natural parents,
but i' a -South Dakota decision' decided under statutese also
similar to Montana's the Court held that an adopted child could
inherit from his natural parents as well as its adoptive parents.
T'he South Dakota decision said the Court could not follow In re
Darling's Estate, cited above, and criticized that decision because
'Supra, note 2.
01 R. C. R. Adoption of Children § 26; 1 Am. Jur. Adoption of Children
§ 57; Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274 (1884).
'In re Darling's Estate, 173 Cal. 221; 159 P. 606 (1916).
sNow, Cal. Civil Code 1949 II § 228, § 229.
'Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S. D. 113; 221 N. W. 488 (1927).
"S. D., 1939 § 14.0407.
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it allowed the adopted child to inherit from his natural grand-
parent, when he would not be allowed to inherit from his natural
parents.
Other cases present the issue of whether or not an adopted
child should be allowed to inherit in a dual capacity when he is
adopted by a blood relative. In the recent case of In re Benner's
Estateu and others' it has been held that when a child is adopted
by a grandparent, the adopted grandchild can take his inherit-
ance in his dual capacity (as a child of its adopting parent, and
also by representation as the natural child of its deceased par-
ent) in the absence of a statute forbidding this. T~here is a strong
dissent in the Benner case which states that it was not the purpose
of the Legislature that an adopted grandchild should ever receive
more than a natural child, and also that the giving of a larger
share to the adopted grandchild will cause greed and bad rela-
tions between the adopted brothers and sisters and the natural
children. The dissent further says that because there have been
so few appellate court decisions on this subject, neither opinion
expressed here represents the weight of authority.
Another question which must be considered is, Can an
adopted child inherit from relatives of the adoptive parents? It
is the general view that an adoption statute will not be construed
to make an adopted child an heir of relatives of the adoptive
parent unless there is language in the statute clearly to that ef-
fect. In the construction of these statutes, however, there is a
difference of opinion, even where the provisions are substantially
similar.' In the case of In re Bradley's Estate,1" under a statute
which provided that the adopted child should be deemed for the
purposes of inheritance to be born in lawful wedlock of the adopt-
ing parents, it was held that the adopted child could not inherit
from a collateral kindred of the adopting parents. The Court's
reason for this strict interpretation was that any statute which in-
terrupted the natural course of descent of property (the principle
that intestate property should descend to kindred of the blood)
should be strictly construed as it contravenes the common law.
But in Denton v. Miller" under a statute which provided that
the adopted child was entitled to the same rights of person and
property as children or heirs at law of the adopting parent, the
Court held the adopted child would take by inheritance the
...-..Utah ...... ,166 P(2d) 257 (1946).
'Wagner v. Varner, 50 Ia. 532 (1879) ; In re Bartman's Estate, 109 Kan.
87, 198 P. 192 (1921).
'83 8 A. L. R. 8.
"In re Bradley's Estate, 38 A. L. R. 1 (1925).
'Denton v. Miller, 110 Kan. 292, 203 P. 693 (1922).
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same interest in the estate of a collateral relative of the adoptive
parent as the natural child of such parent would take. This view
has been sustained under relatively modern statutes and cases."
The final question that presents itself under the heading of
inheritance to an adopted child is, Can the adopted child inherit
from its natural lineal or collateral relatives, excluding the nat-
ural parents? In the case of In re Darting's Estate" the Court
allowed an adopted child to inherit from his natural grandparent
even though they would not allow him to inherit from his natural
parents. The Court stated:
"So far as we have been able to find there is no de-
cision under statutes anything like ours, to the effect
that the adopted child has any right of inheritance as to
the ancestors of collateral kindred of the adopting par-
ents, or is deprived by the adoption of any rights of in-
heritance that he had as to the ancestors and collateral
kindred of his parents by blood."
Although this seems to be the prevailing view as most courts will
not interfere with the adoptee's right to inherit from his blood
relatives unless there is an express statutory provision denying
this right, the Court in the Darting case interpreted the Cali-
fornia adoption statute as denying the adoptee the right to inherit
from his natural parents, but as giving him the right to inherit
from his natural grandparents. Interpretations like this make it
very uncertain as to how the Montana Supreme Court would in-
terpret this problem under a similar statute.
II. Inheritance Through the Adopted Child
It has generally been held that when the adopted child dies
before his adoptive parents, the children of the adopted child
will inherit their parent's share in the estate of the adopter.'s In
the California case of In re Hebert's Estate" the Court construed
certain Statutes in the Probate Code as allowing the heirs of the
decedent's adopted son who predeceased decedent to inherit per-
sonalty of the decedent. The Statute the Court construed was
enacted after the California cases previously discussed were de-
cided, and Montana does not have a similar statute. This Statute
defines the rights of the adopted child as between its natural and
adoptive parents but does not define the inheritance rights of
11927 Minn. Stat. § 8630; McCune v. Oldham, 213 Ia. 1221; 240 N.W. 278
(1932) ; Sutton v. Kummer, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925).
"Supra, note 7.
'In re Webb's Estate, 250 Penn. 179; P5 A. 419 (1925) ; 2 C. J. S. Adop-
tion § 65; ATKINSON, WIu.LS, § 31, p. 67 (1937).
"42 Cal. App. (2nd) 664; 109 P(2nd) 729 (1941).
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those who may inherit through the adopted child. It was argued
in behalf of the decedent's natural, collateral relatives that the
legislature in adopting this section had expressed the entire rights
of inheritance of adopted children, and that adopted children
could have no rights other than those expressly stated in the sec-
tion. This argument was not sustained, and the Court implied
from this Statute that heirs of adopted children would have
rights although these rights were not expressed. However in an
Alabama case where the Court discussed this point they said:
"It is well settled that the right of adoption is pure-
ly statutory, and in derogation of the common law, and
unless the statute by express provisions or necessary im-
plications confers on the children of an adopted child the
right of succession, such children do not inherit from the
adopting child."'
This is another illustration of the need for express statutory pro-
visions as to these rights.
III. Inheritance from the Adopted Child
"In the absence of an express statutory provision
defining the matter, there is a conflict of authority as
to the course of succession upon the death of the adopted
children; some hold the estate to vest in the natural
kindred, while others hold it to vest in the foster or
adoptive parents.'
Under the construction given the various state statutes by
most courts the adoptive parents of a child dying intestate who
leaves surviving him neither a widow, a child, nor a descendant of
a child, inherit the estate of the child."
In Calhoun v. Bryant' the Court, construing statutes on the
rights of adopted children, stated that while these statutes did not
contain any specific provision as to the right of inheritance, they
did provide that, "after adoption the two shall sustain towards
each other the relation of parent and child, having all the rights
and duties of that relation." From this the Court held that the
relation between foster parents and adopted children is the same
as that between natural parents and children, and therefore an
adoptive parent may inherit real property owned by an adopted
child. Also in a Nebraska case" under a similar statute the Court
held that an adoptive mother, rather than a natural father, was
"Meeks v. Cornelius, 224 Ala. 532, 14 So. (2nd) 145 (1943).
'2 C. J. S. Adoption § 64.
21170 A. L. R. 742.
28 S. D. 266,133 N. W. 266 (1911).2
'In re Enyart's Estate, 116 Neb. 450; 218 N. W. 89 (1928).
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entitled to inherit the state of an adopted child, and the court
pointed out that the right conferred by this statute was a recipro-
cal one dependent upon the relation created by an adoption under
the statute and that, since it had been held that an adopted child
inherits from an adoptive parent, the converse was likewise true.'
In Appeal of Simmons' the Maine Court construed a Statute
which provided that the adopted child should "sustain the same
relation to them [the adoptive parents] and to their estate at all
times as if born in lawful wedlock," as not bestowing rights of
inheritance upon the adopting parents. The Court also stated
that the words "relation to them" undoubtedly referred to per-
sonal relations-those of custody, obedience, education, and main-
tenance ; and that the words "to their estate" referred to the dis-
tribution of the adopting parent's estate to the adopted child,
and not the adopted child's estate to the adoptive parents.
Also in a New Jersey case' which was decided under a
Statute which invested rights of inheritance upon the adopted
child from the adopted parent as if the adopted child had been
born to them in lawful wedlock, the Court held the adoptive fa-
ther was not the next of kin of the adopted child, but that the
blood relatives were the next of kin. The Court reached this re-
sult by the reasoning that the property of an adopted child will
descend to his relatives by blood rather than to his relatives by
adoption unless the statute by explicit provision or necessary
construction excludes the former in favor of the latter.
The above cases are not cited in this comment for their hold-
ings, but they are used to illustrate how the courts interpret
adoption statutes when the rights of inheritance of adopted chil-
dren are not expressly provided for. The South Dakota and
Nebraska cases are liberal in their interpretations of statutes
which are not well-defined as to the inheritance rights, while the
Maine and New Jersey cases are quite strict in their interpreta-
tion.
Another point which has confronted the courts is, Do the
kindred of the adoptive parents have the right of inheritance
from the adopted child ? In the case of Dodson v. Ward' the
Court held that relations by blood are entitled to take in prefer-
ence to the father of the adoptive parent. The Court said:
" ... even though the adoptive parent by virtue of
tm8upra, note 22.
"121 Me. 91; 115 A. 765 (1922).
NHeidecamp v. Jersey City etc., 69 N. J. Law 284, 55 A. 239 (1903).
31 N. M. 54; 240 P. 991 (1925) ; See also Baker v. Clowser, 158 Ia. 156,
138 N. W. 837 (1912) ; In re Frazier, 180 Ore. 232, 177 (P(2nd) 254, 170
A. L. R. 729 (1947).
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the statute may inherit from the adopted child by rea-
son of the reciprocal relation of parent and child, yet in
the absence of a statute extending the relation further,
the co-called reciprocal relation stops there."
The opposite result was reached in Lanferman v. Venzile'
where the Court, construing a statute similar to that in the above
case, allowed the kindred (the natural children) of the adoptive
father to inherit from the adopted child. However there is a
strong dissent in this case which states that the majority of the
Court is writing into the Statute an intent which it was never
meant to have.
Conclusion
The purpose of this comment has been to illustrate within
a limited scope the problems that can arise as to the inheritance
rights of adopted children, and to make evident the need for an
express statute defining these rights. The wording of R. C. M.
Section 61-134, which provides that the adopted child shall have
all the rights of the relation of parent and child, has been inter-
preted by courts in other states having statutes using similar
phraseology as not giving the adopted child all of the rights of
inheritance that pertain to that relation. Whether or not the
Montana Supreme Court will construe this Statute as giving the
adopted child all of the inheritance rights of a natural child is
not certain.
This uncertainty can probably be most effectively removed
by the adoption of Section twenty-seven of the Model Probate
Code in Montana. This Section provides:
"For the purpose of inheritance to, through and
from a legally adopted child, such child shall be treated
the same as if he were the natural child of his adopting
parents, and he shall cease to be treated as the child of
his natural parents for purposes of intestate succession. "
This Section states clearly the rights of inheritance of the adopted
child and of those who will take through and from the adopted
child. As the Montana Statute on the effect of adoption was
written with the intent that the adopted child should have all
of the rights that pertain to the relation of parent and child,
the enactment of this section of the Model Probate Code would
expressly define those rights in respect to inheritance and so re-
move considerable uncertainty that will always remain until we
2150 Ky. 751; 150 S. W. 1008 (1912) ; see also In re Dempster, 247 Mich.
459; 226 N. W. 243 (1929).
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get specific decisions on all the points that may arise under the
statutes of the traditional type; that process may take many
years.
ROBERT J. HOLLAND
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE IN MONTANA
The Restatement of the Law of Torts provides that:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily
harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a
structure or other artificial condition which he main-
tains upon the land, if
a. the place where the condition is maintained is one
upon which the possessor knows or should know that
such children are likely to trespass, and
b. the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
should know and which he realizes or should realize
as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm to such children, and
c. the children because of their youth do not discover
the condition or realize the risk involved in inter-
meddling in it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
d. the utility to the possessor of maintaining the con-
dition is slight as compared to the risk to young chil-
dren involved therein."
Students of tort law will note with satisfaction that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court evidenced awareness of the implications of
this statement in its recent decision of January 16, 1952, Nichols
v. Consolidated Dairies of Lake County.
The attractive nuisance doctrine traces its origin to an Eng-
lish case decided in 1841, wherein a defendant who left a horse
and cart unattended on the street was held liable after a child
climbed on the cart and was then thrown off and injured when
the horse started suddenly at the urging of another child."
Sioux City and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Stout,' decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1873, is generally considered the
leading American case on the doctrine,' though there appear to
1§ 339.
....... Mont ...... . 239 P. (2d) 740 (1952).
'Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
'17 Wall. (U.S.) 657 (1873).
'Hudson, The Turntable Caaes in the Federal Court8, 36 HAiav. L. Rgv.
826 (1922-23).
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